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  The poorest nations of the world suffer from extreme disease burdens, which go 
largely untreated because weak incomes and the prevailing system of intellectual 
property rights fail to provide sufficient incentives to develop new treatments and 
distribute them at low cost.  Recent price reductions for HIV/AIDS drugs are encouraging 
but offer only a limited solution.  We discuss the economic tradeoffs involved in 
supporting drug and vaccine research through exclusive rights and distributing the fruits 
of that research to poor countries.  We offer a proposal to overcome these incentive 
problems.  Our DEFEND ("Developing Economies' Fund for Essential New Drugs") 
proposal would work within the existing international legal structure but significantly 
would raise the returns to R&D in critical medicines and expand distribution programs.  
A public international organization would purchase the license rights for designated areas 
and distribute the drugs at low cost with a required co-payment from local governments.  
Furthermore, governments would restrict parallel trade to support desirable price 
discrimination.  Costs would be funded largely by increased foreign assistance from the 
developed nations, but these costs would be low in relation to current aid budgets.  We 
believe a strong program could be mounted for $8 billion to $12 billion per year and 
would be an extremely effective use of foreign aid. 
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1. Introduction 
Perhaps the most critical task currently facing the global economy is to devise 
mechanisms that both encourage research aimed at finding treatments for diseases that 
are common in impoverished nations and that achieve widespread international 
distribution of these treatments at sufficiently low costs to be effective and affordable.  
This issue has achieved prominence by virtue of the severe epidemic of the HIV virus, 
which inevitably leads to the onset of AIDS, in Sub-Saharan Africa and, increasingly, in 
South Asia and Southeast Asia.   
HIV/AIDS is not the only disease that plagues poor nations, where malaria, 
tuberculosis, and other maladies are equally lethal and debilitating.  Indeed, HIV/AIDS is 
unusual in that strong incentives for pharmaceutical companies to develop treatments for 
sufferers in high-income economies have resulted in medicines that effectively permit 
patients to function well for many years before onset of the disease.  In that regard, the 
current debate is about how best to transfer these medicines to poor countries.  In 
contrast, there is virtually no R&D aimed at producing new treatments for malaria or 
tuberculosis.  This situation arises largely because those who suffer are overwhelmingly 
poor and could not afford medicines in sufficient quantities to cover R&D costs.  The 
problem is accentuated by weak patent protection in potential markets, further reducing 
the willingness of pharmaceutical enterprises to develop new drugs and vaccines. 
To put it in economic terms, under the current system the incentives to achieve 
efficient dynamic and static provision of medicines are grossly inadequate in the face of 
massive poverty.  To deal with this problem essentially two programs have been 
advanced in recent years, which are considerably at odds with each other.  On the one   2
hand, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
within the World Trade Organization requires member countries to grant and enforce 
patents for new pharmaceutical products (Maskus, 2000a; Gorlin, 1999).  More precisely, 
developers of new drugs have enjoyed exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) in all WTO 
members since January 1, 1995.  While product patents are not required until the year 
2005 in the least-developed countries, EMRs provide similar protection.  Various 
economic studies suggest that this new regime could raise prices of new drugs markedly 
in developing countries (Watal, 1999; Fink, 2000; Lanjouw, 1998; Subramanian 1995), 
though substantial uncertainty remains on this point.
1  Thus, some possibility exists that 
patents will raise incentives for R&D in these neglected diseases (Lanjouw, 1998).  
However, this policy shift does nothing directly to increase incomes of sufferers, who 
would, if anything, become less able to afford new medicines.
2   
Thus, on the other hand, considerable pressure has mounted on pharmaceutical 
companies to provide their drugs at marginal production cost (or less) to poor countries. 
Several firms have responded, such as Merck & Co., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC, and Abbott Laboratories.  For example, Merck & Co. recently 
announced it would reduce the prices of two AIDS-controlling drugs in Africa by 40% to 
55%, adding to sharp price cuts announced in 2000.
3  Abbott announced that it would sell 
its two AIDS drugs, Norvir and Kaletra, at a price that would earn the company no 
profit.
4  In some degree these actions are a competitive response to offers by two Indian 
                                                           
1 See Rozek and Berkowitz (1998) for a dissenting view. 
2 See Abbott (2000) for a legal analysis of the pharmaceutical aspects of TRIPS, claiming that the 
agreement raises difficult contradictions between the trading system and needs for protecting public health. 
3 Wall Street Journal, "Price War Breaks Out Over AIDS Drugs in Africa as Generics Present Challenge," 
7 March 2001. 
4 Wall Street Journal, "Abbott to Cut Prices on AIDS Drugs Distributed in Sub-Saharan Africa," 27 March 
2001.   3
producers of generic AIDS drugs, Cipla Ltd. and Hetero Drugs Ltd., to provide medicines 
at even lower prices.  As we note in the next section, however, even at these prices the 
drugs may be beyond the reach of most patients. 
The research-intensive pharmaceutical firms that invented these drugs have three 
concerns about low-cost distribution programs.  First, provision at marginal cost or lower 
adds nothing to their ability to cover the fixed costs of R&D.  Second, while they may be 
willing to circulate their medicines cheaply, the firms are anxious to retain the exclusive 
distribution rights inherent in patents and EMRs.  Indeed, this preference to forestall 
generic competition is the root of the ongoing lawsuit raised by 39 drug makers in South 
Africa aimed at striking down that country's 1997 Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Act.
5   
Third, and perhaps most significantly, original drug developers worry that the 
availability of far-cheaper treatments in poor countries could erode their price-setting 
power in rich countries.  This erosion could happen directly through unauthorized parallel 
trade in drugs or indirectly through political pressure mounted by patients and insurance 
companies on health authorities to require significant price reductions.  Because the vast 
bulk of returns to R&D are realized in the United States, the European Union, and other 
industrialized nations, pharmaceutical companies argue that such price spillovers would 
significantly hamper their incentives to develop new treatments.
6 
Control over patent rights in AIDS treatments is now before the WTO in a dispute 
raised by the United States against Brazil in February 2001.  Under Article 71 of Brazil's 
1997 Patent Act, foreign firms must manufacture patented drugs within Brazil before 
                                                           
5 Wall Street Journal, "Big Drug Firms Defend Right to Patents on AIDS Drugs in South African Court," 6 
March 2001.   4
three years have elapsed from patent grant.  Failure to meet these "working requirements" 
could result in an order by the Brazilian Health Ministry to local firms to manufacture 
generic substitutes, a threat that currently faces makers of the AIDS drugs Efavirenz 
(Merck & Co.) and Nelfinavir (Roche).
7  The TRIPS Agreement would seem to restrict 
considerably Brazil's ability to enforce working requirements.  Thus, this case could set 
an important precedent concerning the ability of countries to limit private rights to exploit 
patents. 
Putting these elements together, drug development and distribution involve 
tradeoffs that implicate important principles underlying protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs).  To begin, there is a strong global public interest in providing sufficient 
incentives for the continual development of new medical treatments for diseases 
afflicting the poor.  Within the intellectual property system these incentives stem largely 
from exclusive production and distribution rights provided by EMRs and patents.  
However, such rights may be inadequate for meeting the needs of extremely poor patients 
that do not have enough income to purchase them even at low prices.    
Further, such rights are national or territorial in scope, meaning that governments 
may choose their own regimes concerning whether rights holders can prevent parallel 
trade.
8  Indeed, the TRIPS Agreement affirms that countries have the authority to decide 
whether exclusive rights are exhausted at national borders.  The threat that products may 
be shipped from lower-priced countries to higher-priced countries reduces the enthusiasm 
of rights holders to supply them at low cost.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 New York Times, "Group Says Discount AIDS Drugs Endanger Research," 13 February 2001. 
7 New York Times, "Brazil May Defy U.S. and Make More AIDS Drugs," 14 February 2001. 
8 Maskus (2000b) provides an overview of the economics of parallel trade.    5
The current system generates numerous undesirable outcomes.  First, there are not 
enough incentives to develop new treatments for endemic diseases in impoverished 
markets.  The resulting high rates of infection and contagion impose external costs on 
others both within and across borders, in part because of lower productivity.  Surely the 
industrialized economies suffer some costs from slower growth in the afflicted countries.  
In this sense, development and provision of effective drugs is a global public good. 
Second, demands that drugs be provided at marginal cost in some countries force 
patients in higher-price countries to accept a disproportionate share of the burden of 
financing R&D cost recovery.  Put another way, patients in lower-cost nations effectively 
free ride on the pricing systems of the United States and other industrialized nations.  In 
fact, the free riding has at least two dimensions.  In addition to the low prices in poor 
countries, price controls in Canada, Europe, and elsewhere mean that patients in those 
nations provide limited contributions to recovering fixed R&D costs.
9  In that context, 
American patients and insurance companies bear the brunt of paying for R&D and any 
losses associated with distribution programs abroad.  Thus, neither pharmaceutical 
companies nor their patients may be expected to embrace the costs of distribution and 
development.   
Third, pharmaceutical firms chronically under-supply the medicinal needs of poor 
countries, partly because of limited exclusivity in rights, including the need to restrain 
parallel trade.   
These problems point squarely at the need for further public involvement in 
encouraging new drugs and in procuring and distributing medicines.  In this paper we set   6
out a proposal for addressing the fundamental problems in a manner that is least 
disruptive to the international system of IPRs.  It involves, first, increases in public 
assistance or public health budgets in the rich countries in order to fund purchases by a 
body such as the World Health Organization (WHO) of exclusive licenses to distribute 
selected medicines in poor countries.  The license fees should be sufficient to cover all or 
a substantial portion of fixed R&D costs, thereby establishing a strong incentive for 
pharmaceutical and vaccine firms to produce new treatments.  In terms of distributing 
these products in poor markets, the WHO would be free to do so at a per-unit price below 
its marginal private costs in recognition of the external benefits from improved health 
status.  Finally, each country or region that avails itself of this program would be required 
to assert strong controls on parallel exports in order to safeguard prices in markets in 
high-income economies. 
The procurement portion of our proposal is similar to the idea for a vaccine-
purchase fund put forward by Sachs, et al (1999).  However, their proposal involves a 
guaranteed price per dosage without contemplating difficulties in effecting distribution or 
in segmenting markets.  It also bears similarity to current proposals for ensuring "tiered 
pricing" of existing HIV/AIDS drugs (Barton, 2001; Subramanian, 2001) but these 
programs make no provisions for managing dynamic R&D incentives.  Thus, we offer 
our proposal as complementary to both of these ideas. 
In the next section we provide basic evidence on the extent of the R&D, 
distribution, and pricing problems in the current system.  In Section Three we discuss the 
economics of optimal provision in recognition of the significant externalities involved.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 The general nature of this problem is reflected in recent legislative proposals in the United States partially 
to deregulate restrictions on parallel imports of prescription pharmaceuticals in order to permit U.S.   7
In Section Four we set out the proposal explicitly and discuss ideas for its 
implementation.  We conclude in Section Five. 
 
2.  Scope of the Problem 
The incidence and costs of endemic diseases in poor countries are staggering.  
These maladies not only afflict high rates of mortality but also significantly reduce the 
health status and productivity of the affected population.  Table 1 provides estimates by 
the World Health Organization of deaths and productive time lost (measured in disability-
adjusted life years, or DALYs) to three major diseases in 1999 for Africa, the Americas, 
and Southeast Asia.  HIV/AIDS is thought to have killed 2.7 million people globally in 
1999, with 2.2 million of these in Africa.  It claimed 81,000 victims in the Americas and 
360,000 victims in Southeast Asia, where the problem is rising rapidly.  The disease was 
also responsible for 89.8 million adjusted life-years lost to morbidity and mortality.  
Again, this loss was concentrated in Africa, where 74.4 million life-years were foregone.   
The victims of tuberculosis (TB) are spread more evenly through the developing 
world.  It killed 1.7 million people in 1999, with 357,000 in Africa, 59,000 in the 
Americas, and 723,000 in Southeast Asia.  Importantly, TB is frequently contracted by 
HIV/AIDS sufferers and surveys suggest that up to 70 percent of tuberculosis patients are 
infected with HIV.
10  Such joint cases are concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Malaria is 
also concentrated in Africa, killing perhaps 953,000 people in 1999 and sacrificing 36.8 
million life-years.  According to the WHO, the direct and indirect costs of malaria in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
patients to gain access to cheaper foreign sources of supply. 
10 UNAIDS Press Release: "World TB Day 2001: Access to TB Cure a Human Rights Imperative," at 
www.unaids.org/whatsnew/press/eng/pressarc01/TB_220301.html.   8
Sub-Saharan Africa exceed $2 billion per year.
11  Malaria is not at this time a large 
problem in the Americas.   
Additional figures illustrate the scope of HIV/AIDS in Africa.  There are now 
25.3 million Africans living with HIV or AIDS.
12  In eight countries at least 15 percent of 
adults are infected.  Infection rates in African women in their early 20s are three times 
higher than in men of the same age group.  In Botswana, 36 percent of adults are now 
infected with HIV, while in South African the figure is 20 percent.  South Africa has 4.2 
million infected people, the largest number in the world.  These figures are rising at 
alarming rates.
13  Among the 1.4 million children under the age of 15 living with 
HIV/AIDS at the end of 2000, 1.1 million reside in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Perhaps 12.1 
million children have been orphaned by the disease in that region. 
Economic studies suggest that South African GDP will be perhaps 17 percent 
lower in 2010 than it would be without AIDS, removing $22 billion in output from the 
economy.  In Botswana, there could be a 13-15 percent reduction in the income of the 
poorest households.  The fiscal cost of the disease is also debilitating.  It has been 
estimated that in seven of 16 African countries surveyed, public health spending for 
AIDS alone exceeded two percent of GDP in 1997, against total spending for health care 
of three to five percent of GDP. 
   These three diseases display different characteristics in terms of treatment costs 
and R&D incentives.  Tuberculosis is curable with a single drug treatment that costs as 
                                                           
11 WHO, "Fact Sheet: Malaria," at www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact094.html. 
12 These figures are from "Fact Sheet: HIV/AIDS in Africa," at 
www.unaids.org/fact_sheet/files/FS_Africa.htm.  There are also 5.8 million living with HIV/AIDS in South 
Asia and Southeast Asia, see "Regional HIV/AIDS Statistics and Features, End of 2000," 
www.unaids.org/wac/2000/wad00/files/WAD_epidemic_report/css/WAD_epidemic_report_5.htm. 
13 At the same time, successful prevention programs in a few African countries, such as Uganda, have 
reduced national infection rates.   9
little as $10-15 per patient.
14  Unfortunately, TB is an airborne virus and in crowded 
environments with large numbers of sufferers, it is difficult and expensive to achieve 
eradication.  The effective approach to TB is procurement programs to purchase and 
distribute these treatments widely in order to eradicate its presence, a task that lies 
beyond the economic reach of many health ministries in poor countries.  Note also that 
there is little research into new treatments for TB.  The World Health Organization 
(1996) estimated that of the $56 billion spent globally on medical R&D in 1994, less than 
0.2 percent was spent on TB, diarrheal maladies, and pneumonia.  Virtually all of the 
latter research was performed by public agencies and military authorities.  
Malaria can be partially prevented through sanitation programs and prophylaxis, 
while it can be treated with available drugs.  Again, these drugs may be out of the reach 
of poor patients.  Moreover, because the disease tends to build resistance to drugs over 
time there is a continuous need for research into new medicines.  The most effective 
long-term solution, in addition to vector control strategies, is the development of malaria 
vaccines, which could be administered to children.
15  However, there is insufficient R&D 
in anti-malarial vaccines or drugs.  Sachs, et al (1999) cite a Wellcome Trust study that 
found that public and non-profit malaria research amounted to $84 million in 1993, with 
vaccine research amounting to a small portion of that spending.  Private sector spending 
was lower still.  We should note that more research into vaccines and anti-malarial drugs 
is underway under the auspices of the Multilateral Initiative on Malaria, involving the 
UNDP, the World Bank, and the WHO, and the Medicines for Malaria Venture, a public-
private sector cooperative initiative.  However, funding for the former comes to perhaps 
                                                           
14 See UNAIDS, note 9 supra. 
15 Sachs, et al (1999).   10
$3 million per year and the latter group is soliciting support from foundations in the 
hopes of achieving $30 million per year.  These amounts seem inadequate for the job, 
given the underlying costs of developing and testing new drugs, and also fail to exploit 
private incentives within the intellectual property system. 
  As a final observation on the current problem, note that even though many 
pharmaceutical firms have slashed their prices for HIV/AIDS treatments in poor African 
countries, the prices on offer still do not reduce per-patient cost burdens relative to those 
in rich nations.  In Panel A of Table 2 we show the current average prices in U.S. dollars 
for six AIDS drugs of an annual treatment for a single patient in the United States, 
Sweden, and South Africa.   For South Africa we show both the prices offered by 
pharmaceutical companies that own patents on these drugs in the United States and prices 
offered by Indian generic producers.  For example, the drug Viramune costs $3,508 in the 
United States, $2,565 in Sweden, and is now offered at $483 (original version) and $340 
(generic version) in South Africa.  In that context the prices are far lower in South Africa 
than in the United States.
16   
However, as shown in Panel B, when these prices are divided by the U.S.-dollar 
value of per-capita GDP in 1998, the burden of these drugs in income units is essentially 
the same in all three markets.  Indeed, the price as a proportion of per-capita GDP is 
lower in South Africa than in the United States only in two drugs and is higher in three.
17  
                                                           
16 Note that Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. quite recently offered Zerit to South Africa for $54 per patient per 
year, making that price much less than indicated.  See Wall Street Journal, "Bristol-Myers Squibb Offers to 
Sell AIDS Drugs in Africa at Below Cost," 15 March 2001. 
17 We use 1998 GDP per capita for this purpose because it is the latest year available.  Note that the South 
African Rand depreciated by 29 percent (and the Swedish Krona by 18 percent) relative to the dollar from 
1998 to 2001, making the Rand-denominated burdens yet higher to the extent that nominal depreciation 
reflects GDP changes.   11
The range of prices of available generic substitutes generally lies below the original 
manufacturer's price in South Africa, but not in all cases. 
 
3.  The Economics of Developing and Distributing Drugs 
A key health-policy objective of most countries is to give patients access to 
existing pharmaceutical drugs at a reasonable cost.  From a welfare point of view, 
effective medicines have a value both to the individual and to society as a whole. First 
and foremost, pharmaceutical drugs have value to the individual, in some cases as a 
treatment of symptoms, in other cases as a cure.  But they also have additional value to 
society as a method to limit the risk for healthy individuals to be harmed by infectious 
diseases.  Total welfare is maximized in the short-run if existing drugs are provided at a 
price equal to, or in some cases below, the marginal cost of production.  
The problem, however, is that developing new drugs typically involves substantial 
investments in research and development.  The average cost to develop a new 
pharmaceutical drug is approximately $300 million and in some cases substantially 
higher.
18  These costs are mainly fixed and sunk once the drug is developed.  
If prices were set equal to, or even below, marginal cost of production the 
pharmaceutical companies would not be able to recoup their investments and the 
economic incentives for research and development would disappear.  The result of 
marginal-cost-pricing is, therefore, that too little investment in research and development 
takes place and too few drugs are developed in the long run.  To correct for this market 
                                                           
18 Sachs, et al (1999) estimate the average cost for a new drug to be $300 million and predict that 
developing vaccines for HIV, turberculosis and malaria would ”potentially cost several times as much 
given the scientific challenges involved.”, p. 8.   12
imperfection, patents exist to reduce competition and allow pharmaceutical companies to 
exercise some market power in order to recover their investments in R&D.  
The welfare optimization problem in a closed economy, thus, involves a trade-off 
between giving patients access to existing drugs at reasonable costs versus profits for 
pharmaceutical companies, which are incentives for researching and developing new 
drugs in the future.  Unfortunately, monopoly pricing of existing drugs causes static 
problems of insufficient market access for patients.  Such problems can be solved, at least 
in theory, if the short-run and long-run objectives are separated.  The first-best solution 
from a welfare perspective is to reward new innovations with a fixed lump-sum transfer 
to the innovating firm and to distribute existing drugs at competitive, or even below 
competitive prices.  
While a policy to separate fixed and variable costs of pharmaceutical drug 
production might be unpractical or even impossible to implement in most cases, it can be 
useful in particular situations.  More precisely, cost-based pricing and lump-sum 
payments for innovations could be the only way to achieve both the current and future 
health objectives in the poorest countries of the world. 
So far we have discussed the problem of static distortions and dynamic efficiency 
in general terms.  It is, however, important to recognize the international dimension of 
this issue. First of all, the trade-off between different objectives is not identical in all 
countries and, consequently, the optimal policy differs across nations.  Moreover, in a 
global economy with trade in pharmaceutical products, health-care policy in one country 
has important implications for policy in other countries.   13
Starting with the issue of different objectives in industrialized and developing 
countries, it is crucial to note that the weights put on short-run and long-run objectives 
depend on several factors and the optimum is likely to vary across countries with 
different levels of income.  Countries with high average income are likely to put more 
weight on new and improved drugs relative to countries with medium or low average 
income.  As long as future drugs are normal goods, rich countries can be expected to have 
a higher willingness to pay for research and development.  Lower rates of time preference 
in developed countries could also affect the trade-off in the same direction.  Governments 
in industrialized countries are therefore more willing to accept high profits in the 
pharmaceutical industry to promote future innovations and improved drugs, while 
governments in developing countries to a larger degree prefer to give patients access to 
existing drugs at low costs. 
Restricting our attention to the pricing problem of pharmaceutical companies, the 
optimal prices in local markets typically depend on the price elasticity of demand as well 
as the potential for arbitrage between markets.  If the average income differs across two 
segmented markets, optimal prices for a monopolist are likely to be different in the two 
locations.  Giving rebates to consumers with low income is often profitable for the 
monopolist as long as the rebated price is above the marginal cost of production and the 
scope for re-sale to high-income consumers is limited.  When discounts for a 
homogenous good are the same for all consumers within a specific market but vary across 
different markets the pricing strategy corresponds to third-degree price discrimination. 
Arbitrage between markets - often referred to as parallel imports - limits the scope 
for third-degree price discrimination.  If both markets are served by the monopolist the   14
price in the low-income country is likely to rise as a result of parallel trade, while the 
price in the high-income country is likely to fall.  The pharmaceutical company receives 
less revenue from both the low-income as well as the high-income market when parallel 
imports result in equalized prices.  With large differences in average income across 
markets, as is the case with developing and industrialized countries, it is quite possible 
that parallel trade makes it unprofitable to serve low-income markets. Under such 
circumstances, it is beneficial for all parties – more precisely a Pareto improvement – to 
restrict parallel imports and increase the degree of price discrimination.
19 
The trade regime affects not only the scope for monopoly price discrimination but 
also, and more generally, the range of differences in health policies in different countries. 
More precisely, parallel trade undermines the independence of health authorities in both 
industrialized and developing countries.  In practice, most industrialized countries 
maintain a policy that allows the pharmaceutical companies to recover their investment in 
research and development through monopoly mark-ups on existing drugs primarily in the 
U.S., Japanese and European markets.  In this context, it is clear that marginal-cost-based 
pricing in developing countries could have serious effects on the incentives to introduce 
drugs in the poorest countries unless the price spillover to industrialized countries is 
limited. 
A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an effective solution to the access-
development problem for pharmaceutical products in developing countries is, therefore, 
to limit parallel exports from the developing countries as well as parallel imports into the 
industrialized countries. 
                                                           
19 As noted in Varian (1988), this result is quite robust. If price discrimination results in a new market being 
opened up, then it is typically a Pareto-improving welfare enhancement. Hausman and MacKie-Mason   15
 
4.  A Proposal for a Developing Economies' Fund for Essential New Drugs 
In this section we set out a new proposal that would help resolve the incentive 
problems plaguing development and dissemination of drugs under the current system.  
We term our initiative the DEFEND Proposal, for "Developing Economies' Fund for 
Essential New Drugs".   
 
4.1. Criteria 
The magnitude of the problem with HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria in the least 
developed countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, suggests that any proposal to 
solve the problem must meet several criteria.  
First and foremost, giving the poorest countries access to existing therapies and 
drugs would require prices equal to, or in most cases below, marginal cost.  The 
magnitude of the epidemic and the low level of income in the poorest countries make low 
prices a necessity.  This point can easily be illustrated with a hypothetical experiment. 
Assuming that all HIV-positive individuals in sub-Saharan Africa were treated with a 
typical AIDS cocktail therapy (Crixivan, AZT and 3TC) bought at US prices, the total 
expenditure for these drugs would be more than total GDP in the Sub-Saharan countries 
put together.
20  
Moreover, for countries with very low median income it can be expected that 
even a small or moderate monopoly mark-up would generate a substantial allocative 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(1988) study this problem in the context of new patents. 
20 The total GDP in sub-Saharan Africa is approximately $285 billion according to the most recent figures 
from the World Bank (World Economic Indicators 2000). A therapy with Crixivan, AZT and 3TC is   16
inefficiency and dead-weight loss.  This is a fundamental reason to separate the 
incentives for development of new drugs from the distribution of existing drugs.  The 
distribution of existing drugs in the poorest countries should, therefore, be founded on 
cost-based pricing while the incentives for development of new drugs has to be effected 
by other means.  We will turn to this latter problem next. 
The second criterion for good policy is that it has to include incentives to 
encourage innovation and development of new therapies and drugs.  The problem is not 
that it is too profitable to innovate for poor countries, but rather that it is too unprofitable. 
For the world’s three most deadly infectious diseases – AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria – 
effective vaccines still have to be invented.  Moreover, most of the existing treatments for 
HIV/AIDS have serious and sometimes lethal side effects.  In other words, more research 
on new drugs as well as improvements of existing drugs for the poorest countries is 
needed in the future.  
The typical incentive for research and development of new pharmaceutical 
products is the prospect of future profits.  But we have previously argued that it would be 
inexpedient and unrealistic to generate sufficient incentives for R&D through monopoly 
mark-ups in the world’s poorest countries.  There are three reasons why reliance on 
future monopoly profits is not a desirable incentive scheme: the monopoly mark-up is 
distortionary, the potential rents are too small and the political risks involved are too 
large for the pharmaceutical companies (e.g. the risk of compulsory licencing or generic 
substitution).  The solution to these problems is to design a scheme with fixed lump-sum 
payments for new innovations, partly subsidized by the industrialized countries with a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
$11,800 dollar per patient per year at U.S. prices and the total for the sub-Saharan countries would be $299 
billion per year, if all 25.4 million HIV-infected individuals were treated.   17
long-term guarantee to the pharmaceutical companies that they will receive some 
reasonable return on their investment in new and effective drugs. 
The third criterion any realistic proposal must meet is that it has to be developed 
within the limits of international law and treaties and must be supported by established 
international organizations.  The most important examples are the rules of the WTO and 
the offices of the WHO.  In particular, the TRIPS agreement requires all parties to give 
patent protection to new innovations, including pharmaceutical products. But it also 
leaves the question of the legality of parallel imports to national governments.  
As we have previously stressed, the problem of access to existing and new drugs 
in the least developed countries is not only a question of trade, patents and pricing but 
also requires financial aid from industrialized countries. This latter task is best carried out 
as a coordinated program by the World Health Organization.  The main functions of the 
WHO are to give worldwide health guidance, set global health standards, cooperate with 
governments to strengthen national health programs and, finally, to develop and transfer 
appropriate health technology, information and standards. 
The fourth and final criterion is to limit coverage of inexpensive distribution to 
well-defined and restricted geographical areas.  The health policies of most developed 
countries have to be taken as given and must be isolated from the strategy for access to 
pharmaceutical drugs in the least-developed countries.  In order to avoid spillovers to the 
high-income, high-price OECD markets the policy should include official restrictions on 
parallel imports of the program drugs into the industrialized nations.  Moreover, the least-
developed countries need to impose restrictions on parallel exports from their own 
markets in order to deter slippage into countries that are not designated as recipients.  Put   18
briefly, we envision a regime of regional exhaustion within the WHO-designated 
program areas but tight controls to prevent the low-cost drugs from escaping those areas. 
 
4.2 Outline of the Proposal  
In the previous section we stressed that a successful strategy to give people in 
developing countries access to effective medicines has to involve four components.  First, 
the cost of giving patients access to existing drugs has to be separated from the incentives 
for pharmaceutical companies to improve and develop new drugs.  Second, the financial 
incentives to invent new drugs for the world’s least developed countries must be 
subsidized by the industrialized countries.  Third, a coordinated strategy should be jointly 
financed by the developed countries and implemented by an established international 
organization within the limits of international treaties.  Fourth, the strategy should be 
focused on the least-developed countries and price spillovers should be limited by 
restrictions on parallel exports.  A fund for essential new drugs could potentially help to 
solve this problem. 
The principal structure of the strategy would be an international fund managed by 
UNAIDS or WHO.  With contribution from the developed - and possibly some middle-
income developing countries - the fund would buy licenses to produce and sell patented 
essential drugs in those least-developed nations that choose to be part of the program.  
Contributions to the fund should be in the form of cash to finance current expenditure.  
Equally important would be binding commitments to pay for future drugs, in particular 
vaccines for HIV, TB and malaria.    19
The program should be open to the least developed countries and all countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
21  Any government, international organization or non-governmental 
organization should be allowed to use the license in the participating countries under 
three conditions: the original patent is respected in non-participating markets, the 
distribution is restricted to patients in the participating countries and parallel trade to 
other markets is prohibited.
22  The portfolio of licenses managed by the international fund 
should be limited to the most essential drugs.  A board representing donors would 
regularly review the portfolio of current and future licenses.  
Payments to patent holders should be in the form of a fixed, yearly, lump-sum 
transfer that would feature three characteristics.  First, it should guarantee successful drug 
and vaccine developers a net present value over the life of the program that should equal 
expected R&D costs.  Second, it should be positively related to the social value 
(associated with reduced mortality, morbidity, and spillovers) of the drug in the licensed 
areas in order to tie R&D incentives to underlying needs.  Third, given that there may be 
broader markets for the new drugs and vaccines, it should be positively related to the 
global share of patients in the licensed areas.  
In addition to paying patent holders for licenses, the Fund could provide subsidies 
to purchase and distribute essential drugs in countries where a large fraction of the 
population is infected or production cost of the drug is too high in relation to the average 
income.  For available life-extending treatments – such as the existing AIDS therapies – a  
                                                           
21 The World Bank defines low-income economies as countries with a 1999 GNP per capita of $755 or less. 
In the most recent classification there were 64 countries in this category. 
22 Production and distribution under these licenses should not be allowed for companies that produce 
generic substitutes competing with the patented product in non-participating markets.  The main reason for 
this restraint is to avoid strategic spillovers due to cost efficiencies in the production of the licensed 
product.  If, for example, a firm in country A were certified to produce a drug under a publicly procured   20
possible policy would be to subsidize purchases so that a specific treatment does not cost 
more than a pre-defined share (e.g. forty percent) of the average GNP per capita in a 
particular country (the remainder would have to be financed by the local government, 
NGOs, donors or the patients as a form of co-payment).  For vaccines these purchases  
could be subsidized to a larger degree (up to 100 percent) as widespread access to 
vaccines has positive externalities both in the local and global community. 
 
4.3 Implementation of the Proposal 
The implementation of the proposal could be gradual.  Starting with HIV/AIDS 
treatment, the Fund could buy a portfolio of five or six licenses for the most important 
AIDS/HIV drugs.
23  For Sub-Saharan Africa a reasonable payment for these licenses 
could be in the range of $500 million to $1 billion per year.
24  Adding a subsidy for 
distribution of the drugs, which would guarantee that the treatment does not cost more 
than 40 percent of GDP per capita in a specific country, would require additional funds. 
Based on prices of generic substitutes, a cocktail of three AIDS/HIV drugs may be 
expected to cost between $400 and $600 dollars per patient per year.  Thus, the subsidy 
from the Fund would sum up to a maximum total cost of $4.7 billion - $8.1 billion per 
year for all HIV infected individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This funding, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
license, with sales intended for designated recipient countries, its expanded output could provide it with a 
competitive advantage in non-participating countries by virtue of increasing returns to scale.  
23 Examples of drugs for an initial portfolio include 3TC, Zerit, Viramune, Stocrin, Combivir (AZT plus 
3TC) and Crixivan. 
24 The lower bound of these license payments would be $442 million per year and is based on the 
assumption of a portfolio with ten patents, an average R&D cost of $360 million per drug (Danzon, 1997), 
a patent length of 20 years with approval coming eight years after the patent was filed, a five percent 
discount rate and a 75 percent contribution to development costs from the Fund (with the remainder bbeing 
covered by profits from high-income markets).  The upper bound would be $1.165 billion per year and is 
based on the same assumptions with the discount rate changed to ten percent and the Fund's contribution to 
development costs raised to 100 percent.   21
would not be a substitute for the $3 billion dollars WHO and UNAIDS estimate to be 
needed for basic care and prevention efforts.  The total cost for an international strategy 
is, therefore, in the range of $8.2 to $12.1 billion dollars annually.  According to the 
OECD, total levels of official development assistance from bilateral donors and 
multilateral agencies amounted to $84.9 billion in 1999, two percent of which was 
devoted to basic health needs.
25  Thus, this commitment would represent a substantial 
portion of the current aid funding.  However, it would correspond only to 0.03 – 0.05 
percent of total GDP in the OECD countries in 1998.  To put this in further perspective, if 
this amount were fully paid by the United States, the European Union, and Japan, it 
would come to only $13.50 per person per year.  In another view, $12.1 billion may be 
compared with the anticipated loss in South African GDP of $22 billion in the year 2010. 
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
The poorest nations of the world suffer from extreme disease burdens, which go 
largely untreated because weak incomes and the prevailing system of intellectual 
property rights fail to provide sufficient incentives to develop new treatments and 
distribute them at low cost.  Recent price reductions for HIV/AIDS drugs are encouraging 
but offer only a limited solution.   
In this paper, we analyzed the economic tradeoffs involved in supporting drug and 
vaccine research through exclusive rights and distributing the fruits of that research to 
poor countries.  Such research is expensive and would not be undertaken by private firms 
without some prospect for recovering expected R&D costs.  However, even if they were 
developed, private property rights to the distribution of these drugs, in the form of patents 
                                                           
25 See www.oecd.org/dac/htm/dacstats.htm.   22
and EMRs, could support inefficiently high prices and generate large deadweight welfare 
losses compared to the social optimum in poor countries.  This system fails to account for 
the strong external benefits of providing additional treatments and vaccines in poor 
countries.  These benefits accrue also to the rich countries, both for reasons of humanity 
and because lower economic activity in developing countries is costly in trade terms. 
We offer a proposal to overcome these incentive problems.  Our DEFEND 
("Developing Economies' Fund for Essential New Drugs") proposal would work within 
the existing international legal structure but significantly would raise the returns to R&D 
in critical medicines and expand distribution programs.  A public international 
organization would purchase the license rights for designated areas and distribute the 
drugs at low cost with a required co-payment from local governments.  Furthermore, 
governments would restrict parallel trade to support desirable price discrimination.  Costs 
would be funded largely by increased foreign assistance from the developed nations, but 
these costs would be low in relation to current aid budgets.  We believe a strong program 
could be mounted for $8 billion to $12 billion per year and would be an extremely 
effective use of foreign aid. 
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Intervention Options. Geneva: World Health Organization.Table 1.  Deaths and DALYs Caused by HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, 1999 (000s) 
 
 
Disease  World:  World:  Africa:   Africa:   Americas:  Americas:  SE Asia:  SE Asia: 
  Deaths DALYs Deaths  DALYs Deaths  DALYs  Deaths  DALYs 
HIV/AIDS  2673 89819 2154  74449 81  2815  360    8866 
TB  1669  33287    357    8721  59  1114  723  14101 
Malaria  1086  44998    953  36838    2      76    69    3071 
 
Source: World Health Organization, World Health Report 2000 (Geneva, 2000). 
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Table 2. International Price Comparison for a Selection of HIV/AIDS drugs, 2001 
 
Panel A. Prices in the USA, Sweden and South Africa, March 2001 (in USD) 
 
Product  Sweden  USA South Africa  South Africa 
US brand  original mnf.  original mnf. original mnf.  generic subs. 
3TC 1709  3271 232  98  -  190 
Zerit 3078  3589 252  47  -  70 
Viramune 2565  3508 483  202  -  340 
Stocrin  3231 4730 500 1179 
Combivir 4535  7093 730  293  -  635 
Crixivan  3339 6016 600 2300 
Note: Prices are for yearly treatment of a single adult patient with regular dosage. 
 
Source: Wall Street Journal 3/7/2001; LINFO, http://www.linfo.se/fass/ 
 
Panel B. Prices as share of GDP per capita (in percent) 
 
Product  Sweden  USA South Africa  South Africa 
US brand  original mnf.  original mnf. original mnf.  generic subs. 
3TC  6.3  10.1 7.2  3.0 - 5.9 
Zerit  11.4  11.1 7.8  1.5 - 2.2 
Viramune 9.5  10.8 15.0  6.3  –  10.6 
Stocrin  11.9 14.6 15.5 36.6 
Combivir 16.8  21.9 22.6  9.1  –  19.7 
Crixivan  12.3 18.6 18.6 71.4 
Note: GDP per capita, 1998. The exchange rates in 1998 were on average 1 USD = 5.54 ZAR  
and 1 USD = 7.95 SEK and in 2001 (until 3/25/2001) on average 1 USD = 7.81 ZAR and  
1 USD = 9.69 SEK. 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000; OECD,  
Main Economic Indicators may 2000 
 